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Background and aims:We examined the potential role religious beliefs may play in disordered gambling. Speciﬁcally,
we tested the idea that religiosity primes people to place their faith in good fortune or a higher power. In the context of
gambling, however, this may lead to gambling fallacies (e.g., erroneous beliefs that one has control over a random
outcome). People who are high in religiosity may be more at risk of developing gambling fallacies, as they may believe
that a higher power can inﬂuence a game of chance. Thus, this research investigated the relationship between religiosity
and gambling problems and whether gambling fallacies mediated this relationship.Methods: In Study 1, we recruited an
online sample from Amazon's Mechanical Turk to complete measures that assessed the central constructs (religiosity,
disordered gambling, and gambling fallacies). In Study 2, we conducted a secondary analysis of a large data set of
representative adults (N= 4,121) from a Canadian province, which contained measures that assessed the constructs of
interest. Results: In Study 1, religiosity signiﬁcantly predicted gambling problem. Conversely, there was no direct
relationship between religiosity and gambling in Study 2. Importantly, a signiﬁcant indirect effect of religiosity on
disordered gambling severity through gambling fallacies was found in both studies, thus establishing mediation. The
results remained the same when controlling for age, gender, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status for both studies.
Discussion and conclusion: These ﬁndings suggest religiosity and its propensity to be associated with gambling
fallacies, which should be considered in the progression (and possibly treatment) of gambling.
Keywords: gambling fallacies, religiosity, gambling problems
INTRODUCTION
Being devoted to the beliefs of one’s religion (i.e.,
religiosity; Esso & Dibb, 2004) has been shown to be a
protective factor for engaging in addictive behaviors. In-
deed, a growing body of literature suggests that people who
are religious are less apt to smoke or gamble (Ellison &
McFarland, 2011; Hodge, Andereck, & Montoya, 2007;
Hoffmann, 2000; Islam & Johnson, 2003). One reason put
forth for the positive relationship between religiosity and
health is that the religious doctrine provides people with a
sense of meaning in life, which facilitates positive living
(Krause, 2003; Pargament, 1997). Contrary to this favorable
view of religiosity, as it relates to health and well-being, is
the evidence that suggests symptoms of disordered gam-
bling elevated among the religious (Binde, 2007; Kaplan,
1978; Lam, 2006). Thus, although religiosity buffers against
initiating gambling, problems may be more likely to develop
among the religious once gambling is initiated.
The purpose of this research was twofold. First, we
directly examined whether religiosity is positively associated
with disordered gambling. Second, we examined a possible
mechanism for the religiosity–disordered gambling link.
Speciﬁcally, we hypothesized that people who are religious
may place their faith in a higher power – a higher power
that will intervene to ensure they will experience positive
events in their life. For example, people who place
their faith in higher power believe that it is possible for
that higher power to intervene in cause–effect relationships
(e.g., asking God to heal a terminal cancer patient;
Norenzayan & Hansen, 2006). In the context of gambling,
however, a belief that a higher power will intervene in
games of chance may manifest as gambling fallacies (e.g., a
belief that luck can be harnessed to maximized outcomes).
As such, we tested a model in which the association
between religiosity and symptoms of disordered gam-
bling is mediated by the belief that a higher power may
intervene to inﬂuence the outcome of a game of chance
(i.e., gambling fallacies).
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THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
RELIGIOSITY AND GAMBLING
Gambling has a long history of being in the “unhealthy”
books of many religious groups (Aasved, 2003). Gambling
tends to be perceived as an activity that is associated with
greed and temptation, the misuse of money, and having a
poor work ethic (Binde, 2007; Ellison & McFarland, 2011).
Given the negative light that is placed on gambling among
religions, it should be expected that the rate of gambling is
low among religious people. Indeed, a small body of
research suggests that religiosity has a prophylactic effect
on disordered gambling (Ellison & McFarland, 2011;
Hodge et al., 2007; Hoffmann, 2000; Koorn, 2011). That
is, religiosity shields people from disordered gambling by
placing psychological barriers on engaging in gambling in
the ﬁrst place. In support of this contention, Hoffmann
(2000) found that people high in religious participation
were less likely to report gambling problems.
Herein, we argue that religiosity may facilitate problem
gambling among those who already engage in play.
Circumstantial evidence for our general hypothesis comes
from Kaplan (1978), who examined the religiosity of
American lottery winners of the grand prizes. He found that
one third of the lottery winners believed that divine or mystical
forces positively inﬂuenced their success. Similarly, Lam
(2006) found a positive relationship between importance
of faith and gambling frequency among individuals who
engaged in lottery gambling. Binde (2007) argued that religi-
osity may increase gambling, because people who are religious
place their faith in a positive outcome on a higher power.
Gamblers who are religious may feel that higher power will
help maximize their success at gambling, despite the objective
odds of success. In other words, people who are religious may
be more susceptible to developing gambling fallacies.
THE POTENTIAL MEDIATING ROLE OF
GAMBLING FALLACIES
Religion and gambling have certain elements in common,
such as the belief that a person has control over external and
uncontrollable events, either through one’s own ability or a
deity (Binde, 2007). People who engage in these types
of thinking are more likely to have gambling fallacies
(e.g., belief that a lucky person can positively inﬂuence the
odds of success), which are the risk factors in the onset of
gambling problems (Toneatto, Blitz-Miller, Calderwood,
Dragonetti, & Tsanos, 1997; Wohl & Enzle, 2002; Wohl,
Young, & Hart, 2007). Indeed, gambling fallacies (also
referred to as erroneous cognitions about gambling) have long
been proposed to have an etiological role in the development
and maintenance of problem gambling (e.g., Delfabbro &
Winefeld, 2000; Gaboury & Ladouceur, 1989; Leonard &
Williams, 2016). For example, disordered gamblers are more
apt to ignore statistical probabilities of gambling (e.g., base
rate neglect and insensitivity to sample size) and believe
that the outcomes of games of pure chance can be inﬂuenced
to maximize positive outcomes (Leonard, Williams, & Vokey,
2015; Wohl & Enzle, 2002; Wohl et al., 2007). Importantly,
the long-term impact of such illusions of control on gambling
has been substantiated with longitudinal methods (Cowie et al.,
2017; Yakovenko et al., 2016). Speciﬁcally, the risk of
developing disordered patterns of gambling is heightened
among players who have false beliefs about their ability to
control the uncontrollable elements in gambling games.
Although the extant literature has elucidated the impor-
tant role that both religiosity and gambling fallacies play in
the development of disordered gambling, to our knowl-
edge, no research has examined the interplay between
religiosity, gambling fallacies, and disordered gambling.
Speciﬁcally, whether relation between religiosity and dis-
ordered gambling is mediated by gambling fallacies is
unknown. In this research, we tested the idea that a belief
that a higher power can intervene in casually related events
will manifest in gambling as a related belief that a higher
power can intervene in gambling games to control the
objectively uncontrollable. The downstream consequence
is likely elevated risk of disordered gambling symptom-
atology. Herein, we use the umbrella term “gambling
fallacies,” which include illusion of control. Our hypothe-
sis was tested in two community-based studies. The ﬁrst
study examined the proposed mediation model in a sample
of community-based gamblers in the United States. The
second study capitalized on existing data from a large
representative sample of community gamblers in a Cana-
dian province.
STUDY 1
The purpose of Study 1 was to test our general hypothesis
that religiosity was positively associated with disordered
gambling among a sample of community-based gamblers.
We also tested whether belief in a higher power manifests
in the context of gambling as gambling fallacies. In this
way, gambling fallacies would serve as the proximal
predictor of disordered gambling. Thus, ultimately, we
contend that the relationship between religiosity and dis-
ordered gambling is indirect such that it is mediated by
gambling fallacies.
Methods
Participants and procedure. The ﬁnal sample consisted of
201 gamblers (96 females and 105 males), ranging in age
from 18 to 73 years with a mean age of 37.96 (SD= 12.74).
In regard to ethnicity, 144 (71.3%) participants self-
identiﬁed as Caucasian. The majority of the sample was
employed full time (n= 116, 57.4%) and earned between
$15,000 and $75,000 USD (n= 137, 68.16%). About nine
participants were eliminated due to missing data and 10
participants were eliminated as they failed two or more
attention checks that were embedded within our question-
naire. Furthermore, we checked the data for outliers and
none were identiﬁed on our variables of interest. Participants
were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk)
system. MTurk is an online tool that allows “workers” to
complete small tasks for monetary compensation and has
become an immensely popular tool to recruit participants
for psychological research (Chandler & Shapiro, 2016).
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Importantly, Kim and Hodgins (2017) found that MTurk is a
reliable and valid method of collecting data from addictions
populations, including gamblers. Participants were compen-
sated $0.50 USD, which is a normative rate on MTurk for
psychological studies of similar duration.
A recruitment notice was posted on MTurk inviting
people who gamble to take part in an online survey.
Interested participants were then redirected to Qualtrics,
where participants provided informed consent. Thereafter,
participants completed a battery of measures that collected
data on societal risks of gambling, including measures of
problem gambling severity, gambling fallacies, and the
inﬂuence of a higher power on gambling.
Measures
Religiosity. Three items (α= 0.88) of our own design were
used to assess religiosity via belief in the divine’s inﬂuence
over one’s gambling outcomes. These items are as follows:
“There is often a higher power looking over me when
gambling,” “There is a divine presence that guides my gam-
bling,” and “My gambling is not inﬂuenced by a higher
power” (reverse-coded item). Items are anchored at 1 (strongly
disagree) and 5 (strongly agree). An average score was created
with a higher score reﬂecting greater religiosity.
Gambling fallacies. The Gambler’s Beliefs Question-
naire (Steenbergh, Meyers, May, & Whelan, 2002) is a
21-item scale that measures the extent to which people
believe that gambling-related outcomes can be inﬂuenced
to maximize success. For brevity – which is required for
research on MTurk – we randomly selected the four items
(α= 0.81) from the full scale. These items are as follows:
“My choices or actions affect the game on which I am
betting,” “I have a ‘lucky’ technique that I use when I
gamble,” “There are certain things I do when I am betting
(e.g., tapping a certain number of times, holding a lucky
coin in my hand, crossing my ﬁngers, etc.), which increase
the chances that I will win” and “I am pretty accurate at
predicting when a ‘win’ will occur.” Items are anchored at 1
(strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly agree). An average score
was created with a higher score reﬂecting greater belief that
gambling-related outcomes can be inﬂuenced to maximize
success.
Problem gambling severity.We used the 9-item (α= 0.91)
Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI; Ferris & Wynne,
2001) to assess the severity of gambling problems. The
items on the PGSI are anchored from 0 (never) to 3 (almost
always) and assess gambling-related consequences in the past
12 months (e.g., “Have you felt guilty about the way you
gamble or what happens when you gamble?”). A total score is
calculated based on participants’ responses with higher scores
indicating greater gambling severity.
Ethics
The study procedures were carried out in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki. The Carleton University
Research Ethics Board approved the study. All participants
were informed about the study and all provided informed
consent.
Results
Regression analyses were performed with gambling pro-
blems as the dependent variable and religiosity and
gambling fallacies as the predictor variables (see Table 1
for descriptive statistics and Table 2 for regression anal-
yses). As hypothesized, the results of the regression
analysis indicated that religiosity signiﬁcantly predicted
the gambling problems, B = 0.07, F(1, 196) = 12.64,
p < .001, R2 = .06. We also found support for our hypoth-
esis that religiosity is associated with greater gambling
fallacies, B = 0.47, F(1, 199) = 58.63, p < .001, R2 = .23.
Similarly, gambling fallacies signiﬁcantly predicted gam-
bling problems, B = 0.12, F(1, 196) = 37.71, p < .001,
R2 = .16, such that greater levels of gambling fallacies
were associated with increased severity of gambling
problems.
To test our mediation model, we used Preacher and
Hayes’ (2004) PROCESS Model 4 bootstrapping method
with 5,000 iterations to obtain 95% bias-corrected conﬁ-
dence intervals (CIs). The results provided support for
our hypothesized mediation as religiosity had a signiﬁ-
cant indirect effect on gambling problems through gam-
bling fallacies, b = 0.56, SE = 0.14, 95% CI [0.32, 0.90]
(Figure 1). In fact, the direct effect between religiosity and
gambling problems was no longer signiﬁcant when
gambling fallacies were included in the model.
Table 1. Correlations between measured variable with means and
standard deviations on the diagonal: Study 1
Religiosity
Gambling
fallacies
Problem gambling
severity
Religiosity 2.32 (1.46)
Gambling
fallacies
0.48** 3.47 (1.44)
Problem
gambling
severity
0.25** 0.40** 3.73 (4.79)
Note. Non-parametric Tau B’s correlations were calculated due to
the skew of problem gambling severity and the pattern of results
remained the same.
**p< .01 level (two-tailed).
Table 2. Summary of regression analyses predicting problem
gambling severity
Variable B SE R2 p F
Study 1
Religiosity 0.07 0.02 .06 <.001 12.64
Gambling fallacies 0.12 0.02 .16 <.001 37.71
Study 2
Religiosity −0.06 0.20 .01 .77 0.09
Gambling fallacies 0.25 0.05 .09 <.001 28.97
Note. B: unstandardized regression coefﬁcient; SE: standard error;
R2: squared multiple correlation coefﬁcient; p: signiﬁcance;
F: F statistic.
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Discussion
The results of Study 1 replicated previous ﬁndings (Binde,
2007; Kaplan, 1978; Lam, 2006) by demonstrating that
belief in a higher power is associated with elevated symp-
toms of disordered gambling. Importantly, however, we
found that the religiosity–disordered gambling link is indi-
rect. Speciﬁcally, belief in a higher power is positively
associated with gambling fallacies that reﬂect a belief in
the controllability of objectively uncontrollable outcomes in
games of chance. A potential reason for this ﬁnding could be
due to that people who are willing to believe that life events
can be positively inﬂuenced by a higher power are also more
apt to believe that the same higher power can intervene in
games of chance. In other words, willingness to suspend
traditional cause–effect logic in one’s religious life is corre-
lated with willingness to suspend traditional cause–effect
logic in games of chance. Unfortunately, when such logic is
suspended while gambling, problematic gambling behaviors
are likely to develop.
Although Study 1 provided support for our hypothesized
mediation model, it was limited that our sample was
recruited from MTurk, which is not a representative sample
(Chandler & Shapiro, 2016). A further limitation of Study 1
was that our measure of religiosity was speciﬁc to religious
beliefs within a gambling context (i.e., belief that a higher
power can help maximize gambling-related outcomes),
which may have inﬂated our hypothesized associations
between religiosity, gambling fallacies, and disordered
gambling. Thus, Study 2 aimed to address these limitations
through a secondary analysis of representative adults from a
large Canadian province, which used a general measure of
religiosity (i.e., a measure that did not associate religiosity to
the gambling context).
STUDY 2
The purpose of Study 2 was to conceptually replicate and
address the limitations of Study 1. To this end, we capital-
ized on having access to data from a large-scale study of
gambling and problem gambling conducted in the Quinte
region of Ontario, Canada. The sample was representative of
the demographic proﬁle of the Canadian adult population,
and the geographic region had similar gambling opportu-
nities to the rest of Canada. Importantly, the survey used in
the Quinte Longitudinal Study of Gambling and Problem
Gambling (QLS; Williams et al., 2015) contained measures
that assessed the central constructs examined in Study 1
(religiosity, gambling fallacies, and symptoms of disordered
gambling).
Methods
Sample. The QLS is a 5-year longitudinal study that fol-
lowed a sample of 4,121 adults in Ontario, Canada from
2006 to 2011. The sample was recruited through random
digit telephone dialing and age and gender quotas were used
to ensure a representative sample of the Canadian adult
population. About 26% of the sample was recruited based
on their high levels of gambling involvement. These at-risk
gamblers were oversampled to ensure that a sufﬁcient
number of participants in the sample developed gam-
bling-related problems during the duration of the study.
The sample consisted of 1,867 males and 2,254 females
ranging in age from 18 to 80 years (M= 46.07, SD= 14.11).
Similar to Study 1, the majority of the sample reported being
married (n= 2,393, 58.1%), being employed full-time
(n= 2,141, 52.0%), and reported an annual income between
$20,000 and $70,000 CDN (n= 2,395, 58.12%). Partici-
pants completed an online questionnaire once a year either
online, at home, or at the QLS ofﬁce. A total of 88.7%
participants completed all assessments. For information
regarding data cleaning, please refer to the QLS Data User
Manual (Williams et al., 2014).
In this research, we restricted analysis to the ﬁrst wave
of assessments. This was done because religiosity was
measured only once throughout the study (at the initial
assessment) and was not measured in subsequent waves.
Therefore, the only time where all three measures were
assessed was during the ﬁrst wave of data collection.
Measures
Religiosity. A general measure of religiosity was assessed
using the Rohrbaugh Jessor Religiosity Scale (RJRS;
Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975). The RJRS contains nine items
Gambling 
Fallacies
B = .12, SE = .02**B = .47, SE = .06**
Disordered GamblingReligiosity
B = .07, SE = .02** (B = .02, SE = .02)
Figure 1. Mediation model with religiosity as the independent variable, gambling fallacies as the mediator, and disordered gambling as the
dependent variable among a sample of community-based gamblers: Study 1. The unstandardized coefﬁcients and standard error shown in
parentheses reﬂect the inclusion of the mediator in the equation. Two asterisks indicate a signiﬁcant path, p< .001
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(α= 0.90) that assess the inﬂuence that religion has on a
person’s life, the strength of their religious beliefs, and the
extent of their religion participation. The ﬁrst item deter-
mines the participants’ religious afﬁliation by providing
nine possible options (e.g., Catholic, Muslim, Atheist, and
other). The second item inquires how often the person has
attended religious services during the past year; this item
was anchored at 0 (not at all) to 6 (more than once a week).
The rest of the items are multiple choice questions with ﬁve
possible options that vary per question. Examples of these
items include: “How much inﬂuence would you say that
religion has on the way that you choose to act and the way
you choose to spend each day?” and “Which of the follow-
ing statements comes closest to your belief about God?” As
items 1 and 2 are not scaled, to provide a measure of
participants’ religiosity, items 3–9 were summed to provide
a measure of religiosity, with higher scores indicating
greater religiosity.
Gambling fallacies. The Gambling Fallacy Measure
(GFM; Leonard & Williams, 2016) was used to assess
gambling fallacies. The GFM contains 10 items (α = .88)
that assess several gambling fallacies, including the belief
that one is luckier than others (“How lucky are you? If 10
people’s names were put into a hat and one name was
drawn for a prize, how likely is it that your name would be
chosen?”) and illusion of control (“Do you think your
chances of winning a lottery are better if you are able to
choose your own numbers?”). Each item is a multiple-
choice question that contains only one correct answer; the
more items the participant answers correctly, the less
amount of gambling fallacies they have. For ease of inter-
pretability, an average score was created and inversed
so that a higher score reﬂecting greater belief that
gambling-related outcomes can be inﬂuenced to maximize
success.
Problem gambling severity. To assess symptoms of
problem gambling, the QLS contained the 14-item (α=
0.81) Problem and Pathological Gambling Measure (PPGM;
Williams & Volberg, 2010, 2014). The PPGM classiﬁes
participants into ﬁve categories: non-gambler, recreational
gambler, at-risk gambler, problem gambler, and pathologi-
cal gambler. Items are dichotomous with the options “yes”
or “no.” In this research, participants’ scores were summed
to provide a continuous measure of gambling severity.
Results
Regression analyses were performed with gambling pro-
blems as the dependent variable and religiosity and gam-
bling fallacies as the predictor variables (see Table 2 for
descriptive statistics and Table 3 for regression analyses).
Contrary to Study 1, religiosity was not signiﬁcantly asso-
ciated with disordered gambling, B=−0.06, F(1, 3205)=
0.09, p= .77, R2= .001. However, religiosity signiﬁcantly
predicted gambling fallacies, B= 0.02, F(1, 3957)= 33.52,
p< .001, R2= .01, such that individuals high in religiosity
reported greater amount of gambling fallacies. Additionally,
gambling fallacies were signiﬁcantly associated with disor-
dered gambling, B= 0.25, F(1, 3328)= 28.97, p< .001,
R2= .01. As the hypothesized model speciﬁed that the effect
of the religiosity (the independent variable) on symptoms of
disordered gambling (the dependant variable) is indirect, we
proceeded to test the full mediation model. Doing so is in
line with Hayes (2009, 2013), MacKinnon, Fairchild, and
Fritz (2007), and others who argue that assessment of
indirect effects via bootstrapping is the most valid test of
mediation. To this end, we once again used Preacher and
Hayes’ (2004) bootstrapping method with 5,000 iterations.
As predicted, the indirect effect of religiosity on disordered
gambling severity was estimated to lie between 0.001 and
0.002 with 95% CI (b= 0.001, SE< 0.001) (Figure 2).
Discussion
Study 2 accomplished two main objectives. First, and most
importantly, we replicated our hypothesized mediation
model with a representative sample of adults. Second,
Study 2 used different, yet related measures to assess
our central constructs (religiosity, disordered gambling,
and gambling fallacies) to corroborate the ﬁndings in
Study 1. Altogether, our results provide converging
support that religiosity may be an important etiological
factor in the development of disordered gambling, insofar
as religiosity may be associated with greater gambling
fallacies.
SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES
To rule our alternative explanations for our results, we reran
our mediational analyses controlling for potential confound-
ing variables. Speciﬁcally, prior research has observed that
disordered gambling tends to be more prevalent in young
adults (Gupta & Derevensky, 1998; Welte, Barnes, Tidwell,
& Hoffman, 2008), men (Williams, West, & Simpson,
2012), certain religious groups (e.g., Catholics; Welte
et al., 2008), and people of lower socioeconomic status
(Welte, Barnes, Wieczorek, Tidwell, & Parker, 2001). In
addition, religiosity tends to be higher in older adults
(Bengston, Silverstein, Putney, & Harris, 2015), women
(Miller & Stark, 2002), and people of lower socioeconomic
status (Schieman, 2010). As such, we reran our mediation
analysis for Studies 1 and 2 controlling for age, gender,
ethnicity, and socioeconomic status (as measured by per-
sonal income). Gambling fallacies remained a signiﬁcant
Table 3. Correlations between measured variable with means and
standard deviations on the diagonal: Study 2
Religiosity
Gambling
fallacies
Problem gambling
severity
Religiosity 12.59 (6.64)
Gambling
fallacies
0.09** 4.10 (1.48)
Problem
gambling
severity
−0.01 0.09** 0.12 (0.56)
Note. Non-parametric Tau B’s correlations were calculated due to
the skew of problem gambling severity and the pattern of results
remained the same.
**p< 0.01 level (two-tailed).
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mediator of the relation between religiosity and disordered
gambling in both Study 1, b= 0.24, SE= 0.08, 95%
CI [0.09, 0.42], and Study 2, b= 0.0008, SE= 0.0003,
95% CI [0.0003, 0.0016], thus providing additional evi-
dence for our hypothesized mediation model.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Having faith in one’s religion is associated with a myriad of
health beneﬁts (McCullough, Hoyt, Larson, Koenig, &
Thoresen, 2000), including buffering people from engaging
in risky behaviors, such as addictions (Hodge et al., 2007).
A potential exception to this rule are the ﬁndings that
religiosity may increase the risk of disordered gambling
(Lam, 2006). Herein, we assessed whether the association
between religiosity and disordered gambling is indirect. It
was hypothesized that people who are religious may be
more likely to believe that they can control the outcome
(i.e., through an intervening higher power), despite the
objective probability of success, which in turn may increase
the risk of disordered gambling. Thus, we contend that
gambling fallacies are the more proximal mechanism that
explains the religiosity–disordered gambling link.
In two studies, using community samples from two
different sources (online, Study 1 and representative adults,
Study 2) and different measures to assess the central con-
structs, we found support for our hypothesized mediation
model. Importantly, the hypothesized model held when
controlling variables known to vary as a function of disor-
dered gambling symptomatology as well as religiosity
(i.e., age, gender, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status). In
Study 1, we found that religiosity was associated with
gambling fallacies and disordered gambling. Similarly,
gambling fallacies were associated with disordered gam-
bling. Importantly, we found support that the relationship
between religiosity and disordered gambling may be medi-
ated by gambling fallacies. Study 2 corroborated the ﬁnd-
ings of Study 1, with the exception that religiosity was not
associated with disordered gambling. Variation in the pres-
ence of a direct link between religiosity and disordered
gambling may be due to the measures of religiosity used in
each study. In Study 1, we used items that measured belief in
a higher power, which could directly inﬂuence the gambling
outcomes. In Study 2, we used a general measure of
religiosity (i.e., the measure assessed signiﬁcance of religion
in an individual’s life, the strength of their religious beliefs,
and the extent of their religious participation), which did not
make speciﬁc reference to the divine’s power to inﬂuence
gambling-related outcomes. It is possible that the religiosity
measure used in Study 1 inﬂated the association between
belief in a higher power and disordered gambling severity.
Importantly, however, the hypothesized indirect effect was
found regardless of the religiosity measures used.
Lastly, it is important to note that the effect size of the
mediation model was small. In addition, the portion of the
variance explained by the mediation model in Study 2 was
smaller than in Study 1. It is possible that the difference
between the observed effects in the reported studies can be
attributed to the fact that the religiosity measure used
differed across the studies. In Study 1, the items referred
to the use of the divine while gambling. In contrast, in Study
2, the items assessed religiosity in general (i.e., not within
with the context of gambling). Although the effect size of
the indirect effects was small and the measure of religiosity
differed in the two reported studies, we have conﬁdence in
the ﬁndings. This is because the hypothesized mediation
model was observed in both Studies 1 and 2, despite the
methodological differences. In fact, we believe that the
difference in measures used demonstrate the robustness of
the hypothesized model.
Implications
The results of the study suggest that certain aspects of
religiosity may be a risk factor for gambling problems,
whereas other aspects of religiosity may be a protective
factor against gambling problems. For example, previous
research has found that individuals high in religious par-
ticipation were less likely to report gambling problems
(Hoffmann, 2000). However, among people of faith who
already engage in gambling activities, religiosity may
Gambling 
Fallacies
B = .25, SE = .05**B = .02, SE = .00**
Disordered GamblingReligiosity
B = -.06, SE = .20 (B = -.19, SE = .20)
Figure 2. Mediation model with religiosity as the independent variable, gambling fallacies as the mediator, and disordered
gambling as the dependent variable among a sample of community-based gamblers: Study 2. The unstandardized coefﬁcients
and standard error shown in parentheses reﬂect the inclusion of the mediator in the equation. Two asterisks indicate a signiﬁcant
path, p < .001
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increase the risk of disordered gambling. We speculated
that the link between religiosity and disordered gambling
may be the result of religiosity facilitating the development
of gambling fallacies, which have been linked to the risk of
disordered gambling. Inherent to religion is the belief that a
higher power can intervene to positively inﬂuence the
cause–effect relations on behalf of the devotee. Although
a belief that cause–effect relations can be positively inﬂu-
enced may provide comfort to the religious, problems may
develop when transferred to the gambling context. It would
behoove researchers to determine which types of gambling
fallacies people who are high in religiosity are likely to
endorse (e.g., magical thinking and illusion of control).
Such information may be helpful in the development of
targeted interventions among this potentially vulnerable
population.
Our ﬁndings may also have some important implications
for addressing the development and progression of disor-
dered gambling among people who are high in religiosity.
For example, one potential way to reduce gambling fallacies
among people of faith who engage in gambling activities is
through educational initiatives. It is possible that by provid-
ing information about the probability of success in gambling
outcomes may reduce the belief that a higher power would
intervene during games of chance. However, this assertion
requires empirical attention. While believing that a higher
power may intervene during times of distress by providing
comfort and a sense of control can be adaptive, in the
context of gambling, this belief in a higher power may
heighten the risk of disordered gambling.
Limitations and Future Directions
Some limitations should be noted. First, the sample in Study
1 consisted of only individuals who use Amazon’s MTurk
system. This may affect the generalizability of ﬁndings as
the sample was not entirely representative of the general
community, which we addressed in Study 2. That said,
Study 2 is also not without its limitations. The overall
response rate for the QLS study was fairly low (21.3%),
thus response bias may have affected our ﬁndings. Lastly,
the results of our study were based on cross-sectional
design, and as such we cannot infer causality between our
variables.
Future research would do well to assess the relations
between religiosity, gambling fallacies, and problem gam-
bling longitudinally. Doing so would help determine the
causal relation between the variables of interest. Second, it
would be informative if future research determines which
type(s) of gambling fallacies people who are high in religi-
osity are most likely to endorse (e.g., magical thinking and
illusion of control). Previous research has suggested that
gambling fallacies consist of two general factors, luck/
chance and skill/attitude, and these fallacies have differing
relations to future gambling (Cowie et al., 2017). Increased
speciﬁcity may help the development of targeted interven-
tions among this potentially vulnerable population. Lastly,
it is likely that there are other important variables
(e.g., psychological distress) that may inﬂuence the rela-
tionship between religiosity, gambling fallacies, and disor-
dered gambling. As such, future studies may do well to test
whether our hypothesized mediation model holds when
controlling for other important confounding variables.
CONCLUSIONS
This research aimed to determine whether gambling falla-
cies mediated the religiosity–disordered gambling link.
Across two studies, we found support for our hypothesized
mediation model. Our ﬁndings add to the growing under-
standing of risk factors in the development of problem
gambling by exploring religiosity (a potential risk factor
that has received a paucity of empirical attention). These
ﬁndings may have important implications in developing
targeted prevention and interventions for people of faith
who engage in gambling activities. Doing so may help
people who are high in religiosity maintain the plethora
of beneﬁts associated with religiosity, while preventing
the development of gambling fallacies and disordered
gambling.
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